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1. Introduction
The standard Bowen model (Bowen, 1943; Black, 1948; Downs, 1957) of political competition
with single-peaked preferences under majority rule generally predicts party convergence to the
ideal point supported by the median voter. This fundamental result assumes majority rule and a
unidimensional policy space. Relaxing these two assumptions, we extend this model to a spatial
model of political competition between an incumbent policy and an alternative under two different
decision-making environments, one being static and the other being dynamic. For adoption, the
alternative must obtain the support of a supermajority of voters who, by assumption, hold single-
peaked preferences over a totally ordered policy space, which need not be a uni-dimensional
set. In the static setup, we focus on the set of equilibrium policies in the core (Gillies, 1959).
Equilibrium policies are those which, if already the status quo, are never defeated in a pairwise
supermajoritarian election against alternatives in the policy space.4 In the dynamic setup, agents
make amendments sequentially and the game can go on indefinitely. In this setting, we focus on
the set of equilibrium policies in the largest consistent set (Chwe, 1994). This solution concept
assumes that agents are farsighted.5 In both cases, our main finding is to determine the number
of equilibria and show how it depends on the supermajority’s size.6 We discuss implications for
the depth of policy diversity and divergence across structurally identical political economies, and
develop an application to immigration policies.
We consider a voting body, N = {1, 2, ..., n}, composed of a finite number of agents and endowed
with a supermajority rule, Lα, and a non-empty totally ordered policy space, Z. The policy space
Z represents the set of possible policies—the number of points or ideological approaches—to a
given policy problem. We assume that Z is totally ordered by a binary relation denoted ≥Z (i.e,
4The core, like the Nash equilibrium, is regarded as a pioneer solution concept. In fact, it is the equilibrium
concept used in the pioneering works of Bowen (1943), Black (1948), and Downs (1957), although it is not called
as such in these studies. Note, however, that all our results are highly robust to alternative solution concepts (for
example, top cycle, the uncovered set, the Banks set, etcetera). Proofs are available upon request.
5To our knowledge, our paper is the first to examine this question in a dynamic setting where agents are
farsighted.
6While we generalize the Median Voter Theorem as a special case of our result, this is not our main finding.
Our main goal is to count the number of equilibria as a function of the supermajority rule and discuss its empirical
implications.
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≥Z is reflexive, transitive, antisymmetric, and complete), and we denote by >Z the strict part
of this relation. We assume that agents’ preferences are single-peaked with respect to the strict
order >Z on Z. The supermajority rule Lα is a function which maps each coalition C ⊆ N
into 1 or 0. Given a threshold α ∈ [1/2, 1], Lα(C) = 1 when either the coalition C consists of
more than αn members if α < 1, or C consists consists of n members if α = 1; we say such C
is a winning coalition, and it holds power to amend a policy under consideration in the election
process. Coalitions for which Lα(C) = 0 are losing coalitions, and they do not hold the right to
amend policies.
We examine the minimum and the maximum number of equilibrium policies under a pairwise
supermajoritarian election between a status quo policy, z0, chosen by Nature, a lottery or an
agent, and an alternative policy z1 chosen by an agent from the set Z \ {z0}. Agents have equal
probabilities of being selected, by Nature or a lottery, to make proposals against the status quo
z0. If z0 wins, meaning that no winning coalition under Lα chooses z1 over z0, then it remains
in place and the contest ends. If z0 loses (z1 wins), then z1 replaces z0 and the contest ends. An
equilibrium policy is never defeated in the election process. we find that the minimum number
of equilibrium policies is a constant function of the supermajority’s size. However, the maximum
number of equilibria is an increasing function of the supermajority needed to pass legislation and
is a function of the way the incumbent policy is selected. This number represents the depth of
policy diversity across structurally identical political economies under supermajority rules. More
precisely, if Nature randomly selects a legislator to make a proposal, the maximum number of
policies is finite, and it is a non-decreasing function of the supermajority’s size α (Theorem
1).7 It follows that the number of equilibrium policies is a non-decreasing correspondence of the
supermajority’s size needed to pass a policy (see Figure 1). One corollary of this result is the
existence of a unique equilibrium under majority rule (α = 1
2
) when there are an odd number
of voters and the existence of, at most, two equilibria when there are an even number of voters
(Corollary 1). The familiar Median Voter Theorem (MVT) (Black, 1948; Downs, 1957), then, is a
particular case of our result, which extends it to a more general setting. If Nature randomly selects
7The idea of selecting legislators and policymakers by a lottery system, also called “sortition”, is old; it dates
to the fourth century BC and is still practiced today (Manin, 1997; Wantchekon and Neeman, 2002; Procaccia,
2019).
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the incumbent policy from the policy space, the set of equilibrium policies becomes a continuum—
a convex and compact subset of the policy space—and we determine its exact bounds (Theorem
2). These findings are robust, in that they continue to hold when legislators display farsighted
behavior in the dynamic setting (Theorem 3).
A practical implication of our analysis is that economies that are identical in terms of their
policy spaces, voters’ preferences, and voting rule may end up diverging in terms of their policy
choice. Theorems 1, 2, and 3 provide the possibility to quantify the extent of this divergence.
In particular, under majority rule, no divergence is possible, unless the number of voters is even.
Under a supermajority rule, policies can diverge, and the policy gap is an increasing function of
the supermajority’s size. Our results can also be used to determine the number of “competing”
political parties in a given election under supermajority rules. Duverger (1963) was among the
first scholars to examine the relationship between electoral systems and the number of parties in a
political economy. He focused primarily on the plurality rule, whereas our focus is on supermaority
rules. He proposed what are known today as the Duverger’ law and the Duverger’s hypothesis.
The Duverger’s law predicts that two major parties will form under the plurality rule (Duverger,
1963, 217), and the Duverger’s hypothesis states that “the simple-majority system with second
ballot and proportional representation favors multi-partyism” (Duverger, 1963, 239). Our analysis
can be seen as an extension of the Duverger’s ideas to supermajority rules in static and dynamic
models of political competition. We find, in particular, that simple majority rule favours a two-
party system, which offers an anology to Duverger’s law. However, this law fails under larger
majority requirement: the maximum equilibrium number of political parties is a non-decreasing
function of the supermajority’s size.
By focusing on the number of equilibria in a model of spatial political competition, we clearly
depart from the extant literature that has primarily studied the question of equilibrium existence
(see, for example, Feldman and Serrano (2006) for a thorough overview of these findings), but has
completely overlooked the issue of number of equilibria. More generally, supermajority rules have
been studied in terms of their equilibrium properties (see, for instance, Fey (2003), Tchantcho
et al. (2010), Peleg (1978), and Freixas and Kurz (2019)) and as basis for generating more
complex voting rules (see, for example, Taylor and Zwicker (1993), Freixas and Puente (2008),
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and Guemmegne and Pongou (2014)). Our analysis departs from these literatures by focusing
on the number of equilibria instead and deriving implications for the depth of policy diversity
across structurally similar political economies. In so doing, we also extend classical results to an
environment that is more general.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we introduce preliminary concepts. Section 3
examines the number and range of equilibrium policies under static and dynamic political settings.
In Section 4, we use our results to explain policy diversity across identical political economies.
We conclude in Section 5.
2. Preliminary Concepts
We model a political economy as a list P = (N,Z, (i),Lα), where: (a) N = {1, 2, ..., n} is a
voting body, composed of a finite number of agents (we assume that n is at least 2); (b) Z is a
non-empty policy space, which is totally ordered by a binary relation≥Z that is reflexive, transitive,
antisymmetric, and complete (we denote by >Z the strict part of the binary relation ≥Z); (c) i
denotes agent i’s preference relation over Z and (i) denotes a preference profile over Z; and
(d) Lα is a supermajority rule (or qualified majority) of size α (α ∈ [12 , 1]). A supermajority rule
is a distribution of political decision-making power among the various coalitions of agents eligible
to vote (for simplicity, we assume that each agent can vote). The aggregate function Lα is a
family of voting rules that includes from simple majority rule (α = 1
2
) up to unanimity (α = 1).
For any policies x, y ∈ Z, the intervals [x, y] (and ]x, y[) are subsets of Z defined as: [x, y] =
{z ∈ Z : y ≥Z z ≥Z x} (and ]x, y[= {z ∈ Z : y >Z z >Z x}), respectively. For a given
finite and non-empty set X, we denote by |X|, the cardinality of X (i.e., the number of elements
contained in X), and n the cardinality of N . For x, y ∈ Z, y i x indicates that agent i weakly
prefers y to x; y i x indicates that agent i prefers y to x; and y ∼i x indicates that agent i is
indifferent between y and x. Moreover, for S ⊆ N , y S x indicates that y i x for each i ∈ S
(we say S prefers y over x); and y S x indicates that y i x for some i ∈ S and y ∼j x for
other j ∈ S (we say S weakly prefers y over x).
Following the classical literature on spatial competition (see, for example, Bowen (1943) and
Black (1948)), we assume that the profile (i) is single-peaked with respect to the strict order
5
>Z on Z. It means that each agent has an ideal policy in the policy space Z, and policies that
are further from this ideal policy are preferred less. Formally, for each agent i ∈ N , there exists




i i z; and (2) for any policy z, z′,
if z >Z z′ >Z zpi , then z
′ i z, and, if zpi >Z z >Z z′, then z i z′.
3. Number and Range of Equilibrium Policies
In this section, we examine the existence and the maximum number of equilibrium policies under
one-shot political games (Section 3.1) and dynamic political games (Section 3.2). To perform
the analysis in one-shot games, we distinguish two cases: (i) an agent is randomly chosen to
make a proposal (Section 3.1.1); or (ii) the status quo policy is chosen by Nature (Section 3.1.2).
We assume that agents have equal probabilities of being selected, by Nature or a lottery as an
agenda setter. Controlling for temporal and geographic factors that affect agents’ preferences and
status-quo policies, what is the relationship between a legislative body’s voting rule and policy
stability?
3.1. One-shot Political Games
Political contests occur as follows:
1. At time t = 0, a policy z0 is randomly chosen chosen by Nature, a lottery, or an agent from
the policy space Z.
2. At time t = 1, a contest is organized between z0 (the status quo) and an alternative z1,
chosen exogenously by an agent from the set Z \ {z0}.
a) If z0 wins, meaning that no winning coalition under Lα chooses z1 over z0, then it
remains in place and the contest ends.
b) If z0 loses (z1 wins), then z1 replaces z0 and the contest ends.
The rational behavior in the one-shot political game above is straightforward. Each agent chooses
between the status quo policy and a political alternative. The incentive driving agents to vote
for an opposition policy is the condition that it is preferable to the status quo. Formalizing this
behavior, let i denote the incentive by which agent i decides to support an opposition policy
z1 over the status quo z0. If agent i prefers z1 over z0 (i.e., z1 i z0), agent i will vote for z1
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over z0, denoted as z1 i z0. The policy z1 wins the pairwise supermajoritarian election if there
exists a winning coalition C that supports z1 over z0 (z1 C z0). We can now introduce the
equilibrium set, defined as follows.
Definition 1 Let P = (N,Z, (i),Lα) be a political economy and C be a winning coalition.
1. z′ defeats z (or z′  z) thanks to C (i.e., z′ C z) if C prefers z′ over z (i.e, z′ C z).
2. z is defeated if there exists a policy z′ and a winning coalition C ′ such that z′ defeats z
thanks to C ′.
3. The equilibrium set E(P) consists of all undefeated policies. 2
An equilibrium policy is one that, if chosen as the status quo, could not be defeated or replaced
by another policy. In a pairwise contest between two policies, say z and z′, the former receives
votes from agents whose ideal points are closer than z to z′, and vice versa. Each agent’s payoff
depends on the distance between her ideal policy and the winning policy.
3.1.1. Nature Randomly Selects a Proposer
At time t = 0, an agent is randomly selected, by Nature or a lottery, to make a proposal. Agents
are identical with equal probabilities of being selected. The proposer chooses the status quo.
Given single-peakedness and rational behavior, each agent’s best choice is to propose the closest
equilibrium policy ideal to his ideal point as the status quo.8 The following theorem demonstrates
the existence of a policy that cannot be defeated in a pairwise supermajoritarian election and
provides the maximum number of policies that can be implemented. Before enunciating the
result, we introduce the following notation: for any real number x, the value bxc is the largest
integer less than or equal to x.
Theorem 1 Let P = (N,Z, (i),Lα) be a political economy. Assume that voters are chosen
randomly with positive probability to make a proposal. If voters have single-peaked preferences
8One can trace a similar argument from the work of Downs (1957) and the seminal essay of Riker (1982) and
the references therein. Even if we assume that the proposer is not rational and he or she proposes his or her ideal
point as the status quo, our findings do not change. Throughout the paper, we assume that agents are rational
in their decisions.
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over Z, then there exists at least one equilibrium and the number of equilibria is finite. Formally:
1 ≤ |E(P)| ≤ min{2bαnc+ 2− n, n}.
The maximum number of equilibria in P is n when α = 1, and 2bαnc+2− n when α ∈ [1
2
, 1).2
Let z ∈ Z be a policy and define S(z) as the number of agents for whom z is the peak. A
coalition of agents S has a veto right to amend a given status quo if S is a winning coalition,
i.e., |S| > αn. Consider the functions f and g defined on the policy space Z as follows: for any








Let define the following sets:
Zf = {z′ ∈ Z : f(z′) > 0} , and Zg = {z′ ∈ Z : g(z′) > 0} .
To prove Theorem 1, the following lemmas proved useful.
Lemma 1 Let P = (N,Z, (i),Lα) be a political economy, with α ∈ [0, 1). There exist two
peaks z∗1 and z
∗
2 such that: z
∗
1 minimizes f over Zf , and z
∗
2 minimizes g over Zg. 2
Proof (Lemma 1) Notice that neither Zf , nor Zg is empty. In fact, given that zmin and zmax
are respectively the smallest and the greatest peaks of Z, then f(zmin) = n−αn = (1−α)n > 0
and g(zmax) = n−αn = (1−α)n > 0, since α < 1, which implies that zmin ∈ Zf and zmax ∈ Zg,
in turn implying that Zf 6= ∅ and Zg 6= ∅. Given that Zf is finite and f is a strictly decreasing
function, there exists a unique peak z∗1 which minimizes f over Zf . In addition, for any peak
z′ >Z z∗1 , f(z
′) ≤ 0, which implies that
∑
z≥Zz′
S(z) ≤ αn. Similarly, given that Zg is finite and
g is a strictly increasing function, there exists a unique peak z∗2 which minimizes g over Zg. In
addition, for any peak z∗2 >
Z z′, g(z′) ≤ 0, which implies that
∑
z′≥Zz
S(z) ≤ αn. 
Lemma 2 Assume that z∗1 = z
∗
2 = z
∗. Then, E(P) = {z∗}. 2
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Proof (Lemma 2) We claim that z∗ is the Condorcet winner. Indeed, let z ∈ Z be a peak.
If z∗ >Z z, by definition of z∗,
∑
z≥Zz′
S(z′) ≤ αn and
∑
z′≥Zz∗
S(z′) > αn, which implies that z∗
defeats z in a pairwise supermajoritarian election. Similarly, if z >Z z∗, we show in the same way
that z∗ defeats z. It follows that z∗ defeats any other peak z. Since there is no other option
which defeats z∗, then E(P) = {z∗}. 
Lemma 3 If z∗1 6= z∗2 , then z∗2 >Z z∗1 . 2
Proof (Lemma 3) Assume by contradiction that z∗1 >








S(z) > αn and
∑
z∗2≥Zz
S(z) > αn, then
∑
z∈Z
S(z) > 2αn. Given that
∑
z∈Z
S(z) = n, it
follows that n > 2αn, meaning that α < 1
2
, a contradiction, since by assumption 1
2
≤ α < 1.
Hence, the only remaining possibility is z∗2 >
Z z∗1 . 
Lemma 4 There exists z∗ ∈]z∗1 , z∗2 [, with S(z∗) 6= 0. 2
Proof (Lemma 4) Assume the contrary. By the definition of policies z∗1 and z
∗
2 , we have∑
z≥Zz∗1
S(z) > αn and
∑
z∗2≥Zz






S(z) > 2αn or∑
z∈Z
S(z) > 2αn leading to α < 1
2
, which is a contradiction. It follows that there exists a
policy z∗ ∈]z∗1 , z∗2 [, such that S(z∗) 6= 0. Note that, in this case, z∗1 and z∗2 are such that∑
z∗1≥Zz
S(z) < αn, and
∑
z≥Zz∗2
S(z) < αn. 
Lemma 5 If z ∈ Z \ [z∗1 , z∗2 ], then z /∈ E(P). 2
Proof (Lemma 5) Consider z ∈ Z distinct to z∗1 and z∗2 . Assume that z is the closest
peak to the left of z∗1 . In a pairwise supermajoritarian opposition between z and z
∗












S(z′) < αn, and
∑
z′≥Zz∗1
S(z′) > αn, then, z∗1 wins. We can also show that
z∗2 defeats any peak z, with z >
Z z∗2 . 
Lemma 6 If z ∈ [z∗1 , z∗2 ], then z ∈ E(P). 2
Proof (Lemma 6) Consider a peak z ∈ [z∗1 , z∗2 ]. Assume that there exists z′ ∈ ]z∗1 , z∗2 [ such
that z′ defeats z. Without loss of generality, assume that z′ is the closest peak to z with z >Z z′.
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Policy z′ defeats z implies that
∑
z′≥Zx
S(x) > αn, which is a contradiction, because by definition
of z∗2 , z
∗
2 >
Z z′ implies that
∑
z′≥Zx
S(x) ≤ αn. Thus, E(P) = [z∗1 , z∗2 ]. 
Now, we prove Theorem 1.
Proof (Theorem 1) First, if α = 1, then the only winning coalition is the set N . Given
that individuals make proposals against the status quo z0, then each peak is a predicted outcome
of the game. In fact, the maximum number of votes that an alternative policy z1 (distinct
than z0) in a pairwise supermajoritarian opposition can receive is n − 1. If the supermajority
rule requires n votes to win, then no alternative can be defeated, and the maximum number
of predicted outcomes is the cardinality of N , i.e., n. Second, if n is odd, and α = 1/2, then
the median peak is the unique prediction of the pairwise supermajoritarian game, because it is
the Condorcet winner, i.e., it defeats any other policy in a pairwise supermajoritarian opposition.
Third, from Lemmas 2, 5, and 6, we show that any alternative which is not part of the interval
bounded by the peaks z∗1 and z
∗




2 , and any peak
in this interval cannot be defeated. Therefore, the maximal number of equilibria is equal to
the number of individuals who have a peak between z∗1 and z
∗
2 . Given that the proportion of
individuals required to form a winning coalition is at least bαnc+1
n
, then the upper bound of E(P)
is n− 2(1− bαnc+1
n
)n = 2bαnc+ 2− n < n. 


























Max. of equilibria (starts with |E(P)| = 2)
Min. of equilibria (starts with |E(P)| = 1)
Figure 1: Number of equilibria and the size of supermajority rule in a voting body of 100 agents
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As shown in Figure 1, the minimum number of equilibrium policies is 1 regardless of the super-
majority rule. The maximum number of equilibrium policies is a non-decreasing function of the
supermajority needed to replace them. It follows that, for a fixed size n of voters, the number of
equilibrium policies is a non-decreasing correspondence of the supermajority’s size α. A corollary
of Theorem 1 is the following result, which derives the size of the equilibrium set under majority
rule and thus clarifies the way Theorem 1 extends the MVT when the number of agents is even.
Corollary 1 Let P = (N,Z, (i),Lα) be a political economy. Assume that voters are chosen
randomly with positive probability to make a proposal. If preferences are single-peaked, and
policies are chosen using majority rule (α = 1
2
), then,
1. There is only one equilibrium if the size of voters is odd.
2. There exists at least one and at most two equilibria if the size of voters is even.
Proof (Corollary 1) From Theorem 1, if α = 1
2
, then the size of equilibrium set E(P)
depends on the size of n. If n is odd, the number bαnc = n−1
2
, therefore 2bαnc + 2 − n =
n− 1+ 2− n = 1, meaning that a unique equilibrium exists. It is, in fact, the ideal policy of the
median voter. If n is even, there exist at most two equilibria since the number bαnc = n
2
and
2bαnc+ 2− n = n+ 2− n = 2. 
3.1.2. Nature Randomly Chooses a Status Quo
Next, suppose that Nature, rather than choosing the proposer in t = 0, instead chooses the
status quo z0 ∈ Z from the set of all policies. Theorem 2 proves the existence of at least one
and possibly an infinite number of equilibrium policies.
Theorem 2 Let P = (N,Z, (i),Lα) be a political economy and assume that Nature randomly
chooses the status quo. Let z∗1 and z
∗
2 denote, respectively, the minimal and the maximal equilibria
when Nature randomly selects a proposer. Then, E(P) = [z∗1 , z∗2 ]. 2
Proof (Theorem 2) The proof is deduced from the proof of Theorem 1. The status quo,
chosen randomly by Nature, can take any position in spatial space Z. From Theorem 1, any
position between and including z∗1 and z
∗
2 , is invulnerable to pairwise supermajoritarian opposition.
In this case, the interval bounded by the peaks z∗1 and z
∗
2 is the equilibrium set, E(P). 
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Under majority rule, the equilibrium set described in Theorem 2 exhibits an interesting property.
When the number of voters is odd and α = 1
2
, z∗1 = z
∗




2 ] is a singleton,
which is the ideal point of the median voter. If the number of voters is even, however, the set
of equilibria may be infinite. In this sense, Theorem 2 offers a more complete statement of the
MVT compared to Black (1948).
3.2. Dynamic Political Games
In dynamic political games, contrary to one-shot games, agents (or coalitions) may vote indefi-
nitely. Assume that, a status quo z0 is randomly chosen from the set of policies. If no winning
coalition replaces z0, then it remains in place on an indefinite basis and the political opposition
ends. If a winning coalition S replaces z0, say with z1, then z1 becomes the new status quo, and
the process restarts, continuing until a policy has been reached to which no winning coalition
is willing to object. Once that policy has been reached, each agent earns and consumes his or
her payoff and the political contest ends. We illustrate the predictions of such a game with the
largest consistent set (Chwe, 1994), one of the prominent equilibrium concepts in infinite-horizon
political games.
Chwe (1994) defines the largest consistent set, an equilibrium concept for social environments
where agents, acting in public, can freely form coalitions without binding agreements and are
farsighted. Chwe (1994) assumes that agent i holds a strict preference relation i over Z,
and coalitions of agents may be endowed with the power to replace one policy by some other
policies. If a coalition S ⊆ N has the right to replace z ∈ Z by some z′ ∈ Z, we write
z −→S z′. Following Chwe’s notations, a social environment is represented by a list (N,Z, {i
}i∈N , {−→S}S⊂N,S 6=∅). To capture the idea of farsightedness, Chwe (1994) formalizes the notion
of indirect dominance that was formally discussed by Harsanyi (1974) in his criticism of the
von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944)’s solution concept which is based on direct dominance.
For z, z′ ∈ Z, z′ is said to indirectly dominate z, or z′ m z, if there exists a sequence of
policies z0, z1, ..., zm ∈ Z (where z0 = z and zm = z′) and a sequence of winning coalitions
S0, S1, ..., Sm−1 such that zi −→Si zi+1 and z′ Si zi for i = 0, 1, ...,m− 1. The case m = 1
yields the definition of the direct dominance. Chwe (1994, Proposition 2, P. 305) shows that
the largest consistent set is non-empty if Z is finite or countably infinite, and there are no m-
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chains, i.e, an infinite sequences of policies z1, z2, z3,... such that i < j =⇒ zj m zi. Xue
(1997, Theorem, P. 455) extends Chwe (1994, Proposition 2, P. 305)’s non-emptiness result of
the largest consistent set by removing the countability and by weakening the condition that there
is no m-chains. As discussed by Xue (1997, P. 453), such an extension allows one to apply the
largest consistent set to models with continuum of alternatives. Note however, that both Chwe
(1994, Proposition 2, P. 305) and Xue (1997, P. 453) assume that agents have strict preferences
over the policy space Z, a different assumption that we make in this paper.
In this section, we examine Chwe (1994, Proposition 2, P. 305)’s non-emptiness result of the
largest consistent set when the distribution of veto rights among coalitions is given by a super-
majority rule, the policy space Z is totally ordered, and agents have single-peaked preferences
over Z. For z, z′ ∈ Z, z −→S z′ if and only if S is a winning coalition (i.e., |S| > αn). There-
fore, a social environment (N,Z, {i}i∈N , {−→S}S⊂N,S 6=∅) is equivalent to a political economy
P = (N,Z, {i}i∈N ,Lα), where Lα replaces {−→S}S⊂N,S 6=∅. We recall the definition of the
largest consistent set below.
Definition 2 Let P = (N,Z, {i}i∈N ,Lα) be a political economy, and X be a subset of Z.
1. X is said to be consistent if x ∈ X if and only if ∀y ∈ Z and S ⊂ N such that x −→S y,
there exists z ∈ X, where y = z or z m y, and not(x S z).
2. The largest consistent set of the political economy P , denoted LCS(P), is the union of
all the consistent sets. 2
The largest consistent set formalizes the notion that a coalition that moves from a status quo to an
alternative policy anticipates the possibility that another coalition might react. A third coalition
might in turn react, and so on, without limit. It is therefore important to act in a way that does
not lead a coalition to ultimately regret its action, i.e., coalitions are “fully farsighted” (Chwe,
1994, 300). In the following result, we show that the largest consistent set is non-empty, and
we derive the maximum number of equilibria in the largest consistent set when Nature randomly
chooses agents with equal probability to propose a status quo.
Theorem 3 Let P = (N,Z, {i}i∈N ,Lα) be a political economy.
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1. Assume that Nature randomly proposes the status quo. Then, LCS(P) = [z∗1 , z∗2 ].
2. Assume that Nature randomly chooses agents with equal probability to propose a status
quo. Then, 1 ≤ |LCS(P)| ≤ min{2bαnc + 2 − n, n}. Thus, the maximum number of
equilibria in P is n when α = 1, and 2bαnc+ 2− n when α ∈ [1
2
, 1). 2
Proof (Theorem 3) Let P = (N,Z, {i}i∈N ,Lα) be a political economy.
1. Let z ∈ Z. If z∗1 >Z z, then z∗1 indirectly dominates z; If z >Z z∗2 , then z∗2 indirectly
dominates z. The only alternatives that are not indirectly dominated belong to the interval
[z∗1 , z
∗
2 ]. A subset X ⊆ Z is consistent if
f(X) =
x ∈ Z : ∀y ∈ Z, ∀S, x −→S y, ∃z ∈ X, wherey = z or z m y and not(x S z)
 = X.
For each agent i ∈ N , we denote by zi his or her ideal point. By definition of z∗1 and z∗2 ,
the sets S = {i ∈ N : zi ≥Z z∗1} and T = {i ∈ N : z∗2 ≥Z zi} are winning coalitions.
Let z ∈ Z be a proposal: (a) if z∗1 >Z z, then any deviation from z by any winning
coalition to z∗1 is not deterred. Similarly; (b) if z >
Z z∗2 , then any deviation from z by any
winning coalition to z∗2 is not deterred. Hence, in these two cases, z /∈ f(Z). However, if
z ∈ [z∗1 , z∗2 ], any deviation from z is deterred. Indeed, without loss of generality, assume
x = z∗1 , and consider y ∈ Z and a winning coalition S ′, such that x −→S′ y. (c) If z∗1 >Z y,
then there exists z = z∗1 , with z
∗
1my via T , and not(z∗1 S z∗1); (d) If y ∈]z∗1 , z∗2 [, then, there
exists z = y, such that not(z S′ z∗1), with |S ′| > αn, because z∗2 >Z y; (e) If y >Z z∗2 ,
then, there exists z = z∗2 , with z
∗
2 m y via S, and not(z∗2 S′ z∗1), with |S ′| > αn. It follows
that f(Z) = [z∗1 , z
∗
2 ]. It is straightforward to check that f(f(Z)) = f(Z); therefore f(Z)
is the largest consistent set, and point 1. of Theorem 3 is proved.
2. First, if α = 1, then the only winning coalition is the set N . Given that agents propose
the status quo z0, the cardinality of the largest coalition than can propose an alternative
policy z1 against z0 is n − 1. If the supermajority rule requires n agents to replace the
status quo, then no alternative can be indirectly dominated, and the maximum number of
predicted outcomes is the cardinality of N , i.e., n. Second, if n is odd, and α = 1/2,
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then the median peak is the unique prediction of the largest consistent set, because it is
the Condorcet winner, i.e., it indirectly dominated any other policy in a the game. Third,
from point. 1 above, we show that LCS(P) = [z∗1 , z∗2 ]. Therefore, the maximal number of
equilibria is equal to the number of individuals who have a peak between z∗1 and z
∗
2 . Given
that the proportion of agents required to form a winning coalition is at least bαnc+1
n
, then
the upper bound of LCS(P) is n− 2(1− bαnc+1
n
)n = 2bαnc+ 2− n < n. 
Having presented Theorems 1, 2, and 3, we now use the results to explain policy diversity
across identical political economies. In Section 4, we propose an illustration which demonstrates
how two countries with identical political, economic, and cultural preferences over immigration
resettlement could implement different policies.
4. Application: Policy Diversity
The government of a country is developing a refugee resettlement program to help asylum seekers.
Suppose that this decision fell to legislators representing the country’s citizens and that the
country derives utility from the number of refugees it admits. The utility can be in terms of
the national and international “warm glow” that it receives, or in terms of the skills or cultural
diversity brought by the refugees. We assume that the net utility received by each legislator i
from z refugees being admitted (z is a positive real number) is Vi(z) = vi ln(z) − z/n, where
1/n is the fraction of the total cost of refugee admission incurred by each constituency (assuming
n constituencies), and vi is legislator i’s valuation of the number of refugees. Suppose nine
legislators (n = 9) collectively choose the number of refugees to be admitted using majority rule.
Observe that Vi is single-peaked, and so voter i’s peak is obtained by solving V
′(zi) = 0, leading
to the solution zpi = 9vi. We assume that vi = i, where i = 1, 2, ..., 9. Then, the legislators’
peaks are: zp1 = 9, z
p
2 = 18, z
p
3 = 27, z
p
4 = 36, z
p
5 = 45, z
p
6 = 54, z
p
7 = 63, z
p
8 = 72, and z
p
9 = 81
(see also Figure 2). The legislator with valuation vi = 5 is the median voter. The peak z
p
5 = 45
defeats all other peaks in a pairwise majoritarian election, and becomes the only peak which is
not defeated. Therefore, under the majority rule, the country grants permanent residency to 45
refugees.
Suppose that the legislators choose the number of refugees using a two-thirds supermajority
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Figure 2: Legislators’ utility functions. The bundle on each curve represents the coordinates of legislator i’s peak.








αn = 23 × 9












Figure 3: Illustration of equilibria for refugee resettlement program, assuming α = 2/3. Equilibrium points are
those between z∗1 = 27 and z
∗
2 = 63 inclusive. We note that for each policy z








rule (α = 2/3). Any proposal in the set {27, 36, 45, 54, 63} cannot be defeated in a pairwise
supermajoritarian election, because all alternatives will fail to win support from the necessary
supermajoritarian coalition. These proposals are shielded from the possibility of amendment on
the legislative floor. Moreover, any outcome in the set {9, 18, 72, 81} can be defeated by either
z∗1 = 27 or z
∗
2 = 63 (see Figure 3).
16
It follows that two different countries that are identical in terms of the number of voters, voters’
preferences, and voting rule are likely to diverge in policy choice if the voting is the two-thirds
supermajority rule. For example, depending on the random voter that is chosen to make a
proposal, one country may grant permanent residency to only 27 refugees while the other may
grant this privilege to 54 refugees. Under majority rule, both countries will converge in their
policy, and will grant permanent residency to 45 refugees.9
5. Conclusion and Remarks
In this study, we derive the minimum and the maximum number of equilibrium policies in static
and dynamic political games under supermajority rules when agents have single-peaked preferences
over a totally ordered policy space. Voters’ strategic behavior is captured by the core (Black,
1948; Downs, 1957) in static environments, and by the largest consistent set (Chwe, 1994) in
dynamic environments. We fully characterize the relationship between these numbers and a voting
body’s supermajority rule, showing that the minimum number is one regardless of the rule, and the
maximum number increases in a nontrivial manner in the size of the supermajority coalition needed
to change policy. The well-known Median Voter Theorem, which predicts party convergence to
the median voter’s ideal policy, is a particular case of our results. Our findings can explain why
highly divergent policies may persist, even across democracies with identical political preferences
and voting rules. Policy divergence increases as we move further from majority rule. Moreover,
in deriving the minimum and the maximum number of equilibrium policies in a supermajoritarian
setting, our results extend Duverger’s propositions on institutions and political parties. In only
imposing the assumption that voters hold single-peaked preferences over a totally ordered policy
9Beyond explaining policy developments in international negotiations, Theorem 2 is also validated by McGrath
et al. (2018), who conduct a comparative study across US states. Leveraging cross-country variation in state
legislative override requirements, they find that legislatures with higher override requirements demonstrate less
ability to override an executive veto. Mapping the legislative process to our model, state governors first propose
budgets and then legislatures pass their own. The budget is then sent to the governor for approval and, if vetoed,
can only be enacted if a legislative supermajority overrides the veto. The supermajority thresholds used in the
study—which, in this case, are the proportions of the legislature needed to override an executive veto—vary
between 1/2 and 2/3. (Note, however, that three states with a 3/5 or majority veto override were excluded
from some models because they also had supermajority budgetary requirements (McGrath et al., 2018, 165).) In
accordance with our results, budgets passed in states with higher override requirements were substantially closer
to those proposed by the governor, with the strongest effects in states where executives’ preferences diverged
sharply from those of legislative veto players.
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space, our model is quite general and applies to a variety of policies beyond those chosen from a
unidimensional set.
Our theory generalizes dynamics in other theoretical work (Dixit et al., 2000), and its implications
align with voting behavior in institutions ranging from state legislatures (McGrath et al., 2018)
to international institutions (Stone, 2009). Additionally, we contribute to existing social choice
literature. Focusing on supermajority voting rules—a topic that has, to date, received limited
attention—the article raises and answers novel questions. What, precisely, is the relationship
between supermajority thresholds and the number of equilibrium policies? And how does this
relationship manifest in the diversity of policies across institutions with one threshold as opposed
to another?
Our model also offers avenues for future empirical and theoretical research. Further extensions
can consider proposal or amendment costs that vary based on legislators’ ideal points or on the
location of the proposed policy or amendment. The model is also amenable to accommodating
“decision-costs” from policy gridlock (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962) and to introducing uncer-
tainty in legislators’ policy preferences. The latter extension would draw connections between
policy diversity and the extensive literature examining the Condorcet Jury Theorem.10
Empirically, the model offers several testable predictions. Do reductions in amendment thresholds—
such as revisions to the United States Senate requirements to invoke cloture, decrease policy
diversity and increase the extent to which proposers (or political parties) compromise? And,
comparing legislative bodies whose members have similar preferences, do those requiring high
supermajoritarian thresholds to amend proposals generate more diverse policies than those with
low thresholds? And how does the distribution of agenda power mediate the relationship between
policy diversity and voting rules? Despite the challenges in finding variation in voting rules across
otherwise comparable legislative bodies (Cameron, 2009), recent research has employed innova-
tive data to discern such relationships, both globally and domestically (Blake and Payton, 2015;
McGrath et al., 2018; Brutger and Li, 2019).
10The question of choosing the optimal system considering uncertainty was first formulated by Condorcet
(1793). See Nitzan and Paroush (2017) for further details and extensions.
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